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Rorty on Pre-Linguistic Awareness in Pigs
Richard
and

Rorty's

the Mirror

book Philosophy
of Nature 1 has been

one of the most important works in
philosophy in the last decade~ in one
chapter on "Pre- Lingu istic Awa reness"
(pp. 182-192) Rorty holds that we
ought to abandon the "Platonic urge"
to ground our moral prohibitions on
an ontology of natu re.
This claim is
important in its own right and as an
instance of Rorty's defense of hermeherme
neutics.
Apparently, Rorty's discusdiscus
sion is not so much intended to be a
justification of a position as· a diagnodiagno
sis of how we think about and deal
with pre-linguistic beings, especially
non - human an imals.
But eventually
this diagnosis reaches a conclusion
. which needs justification, that "we
send pigs to slaughter with equanimequanim
ity.
. this is not 'irrational'" (p.
190).
In this paper I claim that RorRor
ty's treatment of non -h uman animals is
not sufficient to establish the case for
meat-eating, as Rorty seems to think.
Although Rorty never treats meat-eatmeat-eat
ing explicitly, I assume that pigs are
primarily slaughtered in order to be
eaten.
Rorty, in an analysis of Sellars,
admits that some non-human beings
(e.g., rats, amoebas, computers - p.
182) are capable of awareness, and
some human beings without language
can experience pain e.g., infants - p.
183). But language for Rorty (contra
Sellars), although it does not change
the quality of our experience, does let
us enter a community whose members
can exchange justifications of asserasser
tions (p. 185). This is not a commucommu
nity of feeling, but a linguistic comcom
munity in which rights are dependent
on a person's relations with others to
whom (or to which) he can speak (p.
187).
That is,
moral prohibitions

against hurting others, the nature of
a moral commu n ity, and the g rou nds
for ascribing rights are not dependent
on facts of natu re, Ii ke sentience; to
believe in a community of feeling as
the basis for moral prohibitions is to
fall victim to the dreaded "Platonic
urge" (p. 191).
Rather, moral propro
hibitions and rights are attributed on
the basis of a being's membership in a
linguistic community.
For Rorty,
the non -conceptual,
non-linguistic knowledge of what a
raw feel (e.g., pain) is like is attribattrib
uted on the basis of a being's potenpoten
tial membership in the social practice
of
a
linguistic
community
(pp.
188- 189)
189) .
"Babies and
the more
attractive sorts of animal," like bats
(7) and koala bears, are credited with
"having feelings" whereas photoelecphotoelec
tric cells, pigs, spiders, and amoebas
are not so credited. This "community
feeling" (in Rorty's linguistic sense)
unites us with anything humanoid.
To be humanoid "is to have a human
face, and the most important pa rt of
that face is a mouth which we can
imagine uttering sentences." That is,
we can imagine babies opening their
mouths and speaking about the prespres
ence of pain, but we cannot imagine
spiders or pigs doing so.
The point that Rorty wants to make
is that moral
prohibitions against
hurting babies are not "ontologically
grounded" (p. 190) in their possesposses
sion of feeling.
In fact, it is the
In
other way around.
We do not move
from an awareness of feelings in oth-·
ers to moral prohibitions designed to
protect these others, but rather from
moral prohibitions to an attribution of
feeling:
The moral prohibitions are
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expressions of a sense of
community based on the
imagined possibility of concon
versation, and the attribuattribu
tion of feelings is little
more than a reminder of
these prohibitions (p. 190).
Rorty's

en

(2)�
(2)

(3)�
(3)

account

seems

to

be

that:

If X is an actual or
potential member of a linlin
guistic community, or if we
attribute language to X,
then it is wrong to hurt X.
If it is wrong to hurt X,
then X is an actual or
potential member of a comcom
munityof feeling, or we
attribute feelings to X.
To attribute feelings to X
is only to remind ouselves
that it is wrong to hurt X.

Since Rorty is as important a phiphi
losopher as ·there is in America today,
he merits attention, no matter how
implausible some of his accounts are.
The following five points should be
sufficient to cast doubt on his view of
pigs and to support my claim.
A.
The fi rst difficu Ity with RorRor
ty's account arises when he admits
that pigs do much better on intelliintelli
gence tests than koalas (p. 190).
Why, then, do we attribute having
feelings fo koalas but not to pigS?2
Because "pigs don't writhe in quite
the right humanoid way, and the pig's
face is the wrong shape for the facial
expressions' which go with ordinary
conversation" (p. 190). One suspects
that the "attractive" humanoid feafea
tures of koalas are arbitrary grounds
for attributing feelings to them but
not to pigs. I for one, and I am not
alone, do not find koalas (or bats!)
more "attractive" than pigs; nor can I
more easily imagine them speaking
than pigs. 3
Rorty's description of

the way In which "we" care about
koalas but not pigs amounts to a facfac
tual empirical claim that is not univeruniver
sally true.
B. On Rorty's grounds one wonwon
ders how he can legitimately say that
pigs "writhe." If to writhe means, as
the OED suggests, "a twinge of pain".
or "to contort the body, limbs, etc.,
as from agony, emotion" (my emphaempha
sis), then how can Rorty say pigs
writhe?
Since they lack attractive
humanoid features, or mouths that we
can imagine speaking, we should not,
on Rorty's account, be able to. attriattri
bute pain, agony, or emotion to them.
C. Rorty may try to escape objecobjec
tion (B) by appealing to his two difdif
ferent senses of awareness.
Aware
Awareness-1
is
manifested
by.
rats,
amoebas, computers, and presumably
pigs, and consists merely in "reliable
signaling" (p. 182). Awareness-2 is:
. .. manifested only by' beings
whose behavior we construe as
the utterance of sentences with
the intention of justifying the
utterance of other sentences.
I n this later sense awareness
In
is justified true belief - knowlknowl
edge - but in the former sense
it is ability to respond to stimstim
uli (pp. 182-183).
If Rorty is suggesting that a pig's
writhing is only awareness-1, then his
attribution of feelings to koalas, bats,
and babies (not pigs) must mean that
koalas, bats, and babies are capable
of, or we can imagine them capable
of, awareness-2.
Once again, this
seems arbitrary, especially when RorRor
ty's use of the term "behavior" is
noticed in the above quote. As far as
I know, koalas and bats exhibit no
behavior that pigs do not exhibit that
can be construed "as the utterance of
sentences with the intention of j ustifustif
ying the utterance of other sensen
tences." Nor is it clear that infants
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exhibit such behavior.
Therefore,
Rorty's imagined possibility of converconver
sation with bats and koalas would be
based solely on the shape of their
mouths.
Further, to lump rats and
pigs, on the one hand, together with
amoebas and computers, on the other,
is misleading. One finds it difficult,
if not impossible, to imagine what it
would mean to say that a computer
writhed, and hence had pain, agony,
or emotion. Yet is is so easy to say
that a pig can writhe that even Rorty
says so.
D.
I have twice accused Rorty of
arbitrariness,
to which
he might
respond that the cha rge of a rbitra riri
ness is irrelevant since any distinction
regarding who should have rights is
somewhat arbitrary. The case of aniani
mals is similar, he might say, to his
example of adult rights descending on
a person on his eighteenth birthday
(p. 187).
There is nothing that is
clear-cut about this date, but after
the eighteenth birthday there is a
shift in a person's relations with othoth
ers.
Line-drawing may be "injudi"injudi
cious," but it is neither a mista ke nor
irrational. What might be unfair, for
Rorty, would be to give adult rights
to all eighteen year olds, except for
some chosen people, who wou Id have
to wait until they were thirty.
He
might analogously argue that it would
be fair, though arbitrary, to slaughslaugh
ter pigs, but u nfai r to ma ke excepexcep
tions for some. pigs.
This stance is troublesome for sevsev
eral
reasons.
While picking
the
eighteenth bi rthday as the date for
acquisition of adult rights is arbiarbi
trary, because there is no precise
time at which people, in general"
become suited for the possession of
such rights, it is not arbitrary to say
that most people should not be given
them at age five and should al ready
have been given them by the age of
forty. There is no reason to pick the
day a person becomes eighteen rather
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than the day before or the day after
his bi rthday, but any of the th ree
would obviously be far better than the
fifth birthday or the fortieth birthbirth
day. So also, shrimp and oysters, as
Singer notices,4 are in a grey area
where our decision as to whether or
not they have pain is concerned; and
if they do have pain,whether it is
wrong to hurt them.
But pigs are
not in such a' grey area, as Rorty
unwittingly admits when he notices
their writhing.
E.
To send a being to slaughter
involves a decision, which Rorty not
on Iy ma kes, but ma kes in the case of
pigs with "equanimity."
This might
imply only that the person who sends
pigs to slaughter is calm and comcom
posed, and is not irrational.
The
word equanimity, however, as defined
by the OED, carries with it the notion
of "fairness of judgement, impartialimpartial
ity, equity" (my emphasis), which
indicates anything but' arbitrariness
since fairness are equity are, by defdef
inition, opposed to arbitrariness.
If
it is fair to slaughter a pig, or a
matter of equity, then Rorty must do
two things.
Fi rst, he must avoid the
charge of arbitrariness, and not just
in the minimal sense of slaughtering
some pigs but making exceptions for
others, i.e., he must find a non-arbinon-arbi
trary basis for slaughtering pigs at
all. And second, he must at the same
time avoid the "Platonic urge" to make
his
position
non-arbitrary
by
an
appeal to some fact of nature.
It is
hard to see how Rorty can accomplish
either one of these tasks, much less
both.
Or, he might try to avoid
objection (E) altogether by refraining
from the use of the term "equanim"equanim
ity. "
Although I will not offer anything
like an adequate alternative to Rorty's
account of pre-linguistic awareness in
pigs, I would like briefly to suggest
how one might give in to the "Platonic
urge"
without
building
moral
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prohibitions on "old style" metaphymetaphy
sics.
Rorty's own noticing of pigs'
writhing indicates that pigs do comcom
municate in thei r own way. Although
Rorty may be right, along with Hegel
(p. 192), that the individual human
being apart from society (and espeespe
cially, for Rorty, its linguistic concon
ventions) "is just one more animal," it
does not follow that it is legitimate to
inflict unnecessary suffering on "just
one more animal."
Pigs and other
animals indicate to us through writhwrith
ing that they are' not capable only of
awareness-1, even if they fall short of
awareness-2. Pigs are also capable of
experiencing pain, as Rorty might
have to reluctantly admit.
It is just
not true that human language is the
only (or at times, the most reliable)
guide to the feelings, interests, or
pains of other beings. In
I n the case of
human beings language can disguise
facts as well as communicate them.
If
a dog's whimpering and clawing at the
door cannot inform one of the animal's
need to go out then neither can the
student's verbal and plaintive request
that he has to go to the bath room.
In fact, the student may be lying.
Rorty seems to have fallen victim to
the dogma that there is a vast gulf
between
natural
and
conventional
(humanoid) bearers of meaning, giving
rise to the gulf between the ways we
treat
(non-humanoid)
animals
and
men. At best this gulf is a difference
in degree. 5
Perhaps he should concon
sider that many, if not most, of the
attributions of pain we make to other
human beings are not based on articartic
ulated evidence, but on writhings,
moans, the sight of blood, etc., all of
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which are
meantime,
so much
natu re as

exhibited by pigs. In the
it seems that Rorty has not
destroyed the mirror of
clouded it.
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Richa rd Rorty, Philosophy and
the Mirror of Nature
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979).
2
I am not assuming a necessary
connection between intelligence and
feeling; I am only searching for RorRor
ty's criteria for the attribution of
feeling.

3
Even on an imaginative level
Rorty's account seems defective; note
the popularity of the cartoon characcharac
ter Porky Pig, or of Mi ss Piggy, who
talks incessantly.

Animal Liberation
" Peter Singer, Anima/
(N.Y.: N.Y. Review, 1975), p. 188.
5
I am relying here on the work
of Bernard Rollin and Peter Singer.
Especially see Rollin's "Beast and
Men: The Scope of Moral Concern,"
Modern Schoo/man
Schoolman 55 (March, 1978).
Also, I would like to thank the readread
ers of an earlier version. of this artiarti
cle.

